


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

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Soviet Union Eastern Europe

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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

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Pravda "Observer" on Portugal

On August 19, *Pravda* published an authoritative "Observer" article on the situation in Portugal. Unlike most Soviet commentary on the subject, the article expresses Moscow's views directly, rather than through the mouths of the Portuguese Communists or other intermediaries.

Like other recent Soviet coverage, the general tone of the "Observer" article is defensive and pessimistic. As the distress of the Portuguese Communists has deepened, the Soviets' seeming confidence about the course of events in Portugal has given way to increasing criticism of outside meddling.

Much of this change in emphasis may be intended to prepare the foreign and domestic audience for the possibility of a Communist debacle in Portugal and to identify villains for the period of recrimination that would inevitably follow. The Soviets may be trying to rebut recent statements by high US officials by building a case that it is really Westerners, not the Soviets, who are interfering in Portugal.

The "Observer" article draws an explicit analogy between the present situation in Portugal and events in Chile just before the overthrow of Allende, a theme that first appeared in a Soviet broadcast to Hungary on August 15. NATO, the Western press, Western economic organizations and, for the first time, "international social democracy" are severely criticized in the article. The Chinese are also dragged into the cast of evildoers; they are accused of cooperating with international reaction by fomenting discord in Angola and the Azores.

Pravda charges that the Portuguese Socialists are providing a rallying point for reactionaries by attacking the Communists, but the tone is less strident than when

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Moscow was denouncing the Socialists immediately after they left the government. Indeed, *Pravda* calls for "concerted action" by the Armed Forces Movement, the Communists, Socialists, and other left progressive forces. The Soviets have repeated this theme, which is now at least nominally in accord with Cunhal's own professed policies, more frequently in recent days.

The Soviets would clearly like to see the Portuguese Communists recover from their present isolation, but there is little indication they believe their exhortations will have much practical effect. *Pravda* concludes with a call for "massive solidarity" with the forces fighting reaction in Portugal. Under the circumstances, this is the minimum that Moscow might be expected to say to preserve their revolutionary credentials. *Pravda* offers no practical advice and provides no clues about what, if any, action the Soviets themselves might take in support of the Portuguese Communists.

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Hungarian Statement of Solidarity
with Portuguese Communists

The Hungarian Communist party has become the first in Eastern Europe to issue a formal statement of solidarity with the Portuguese Communist Party. In a 113-word statement to the PCP Central Committee that had clearly been coordinated with Moscow, the Hungarian party Central Committee expresses shock at the "increasingly organized" attacks against Portuguese democratic development; cites cooperation between the "democracy antifascist forces" as the best defense; and assures "the Portuguese Communists and the antifascists" of Hungarian solidarity.

The Hungarian declaration, made no promise of any aid. Verbal statements such as this provide an easy way for the Soviets to display their support of the Portuguese Communists, and the Hungarian statement will probably be followed by others from Eastern Europe.

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The Coup in Bangladesh--Moscow's Reaction

The Soviets have been publicly noncommittal about last week's coup in Bangladesh, but--like most observers--undoubtedly see it as a setback for Soviet and Indian interests in Bangladesh.

Moscow had its problems with former President Mujib, who resented Soviet niggardliness in providing economic aid. The Soviets felt, nonetheless, that he was the only person who could keep Bangladesh from disintegrating under the burden of its economic problems. They welcomed his assumption of more authoritarian power not only because it was in keeping with their own political traditions, but also because they hoped it would enable him to deal more effectively with Bangladesh's problems.

The coup seems to have taken Moscow by surprise. The day before, one of the USSR's South Asian "experts" in Moscow had said he thought Mujib had a good chance of ridding the Bengali government of its administrative chaos and corruption because Mujib enjoyed broad popular support, especially among younger cadres. The day of the coup, Soviet officials in Dacca were busily scurrying about town trying to find out about the origins of the coup and the orientation of the new regime.

The Soviets are probably uneasy about Pakistan's early recognition of the new regime, fearing that a Pakistani-Bengalee rapprochement can take place only at the expense of Dacca's ties to New Delhi and Moscow. They are also unhappy about the alleged pro-US sympathies of the coup leaders. Their greatest concern, however, is that the new government will move to improve Bangladesh's relations with China.

Until they have a better idea of which way the wind is blowing, the Soviets are unlikely to do or

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say anything that would antagonize the new leaders. Moscow will probably let India take the lead in testing the sincerity of the new government's pledges that Bangladesh will continue to follow the same foreign policy as before. The Soviets will caution India against overreaction even though India apparently needs no such advice.

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while India believes the new government is anti-Indian and anti-Soviet, it will "wait and see."

The Soviets may be worried about the "domino effect" of events in Bangladesh or neighboring India. Moscow has supported Prime Minister Gandhi's power grab, but even prior to the coup expressed concern over the possibility of a right-wing reaction to Gandhi's recent moves.

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Polish Regime Restricts Information
on Helsinki and German Agreements

The Polish regime's unwillingness to publish either the full text of the final document signed at the Helsinki conference or the details of its recent accord with Bonn indicates that Warsaw is concerned about coping with public reactions.

Despite its outpouring of support for the Helsinki document and its calls for giving the document the force of international law, the Polish leaders apparently believe that the freer movement issues embodied in Basket Three could create unacceptable popular demands. At Helsinki, party chief Gierek appeared defensive about Basket Three, and excerpts of the CSCE agreement published in *Trybuna Ludu*, the party newspaper, have carefully juxtaposed stipulations on sovereignty and non-interference with the passage on freer exchanges. A Foreign Ministry official commented to a US diplomat that nothing in Basket Three would be acceptable if it interfered with the socialist system and its ideals.

News media in Warsaw have also failed to publish the full details of the agreements that Gierek and West German Chancellor Schmidt reached in Helsinki. Polish officials initially justified the limited coverage by explaining that they did not want to jeopardize the ratification process in Bonn. Although Warsaw has now told the public that Poland will receive substantial sums of money, it still has not mentioned the provision that permits 120,000 ethnic Germans in Poland to emigrate in the next four years.

All the East European regimes face the basic dilemma of balancing popular expectations raised

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by the Helsinki summit with preservation of the Communist value system. The problem facing the Polish leadership is compounded by the strong pro-Western sentiment in Poland, which is likely to lead to a flood of travel and emigration applications. The Poles will also be expected to mesh their response to domestic hopes with Soviet efforts to improve the bloc's ideological cohesion. If past Polish practices are accurate indicators, Warsaw will do little more than pay lip service to calls for increased ideological indoctrination.

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